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SUMMARY 
Background: The Government of Ghana’s fee 
exemption policy for delivery care introduced in 
September 2003, aimed at reducing financial barri-
ers to using maternal services.  This policy also 
aimed to increase the rate of skilled attendance at 
delivery, reduce maternal and perinatal mortality 
rates and contribute to reducing poverty.  
Objective: To evaluate the economic outcomes of 
the policy on households in Ghana. 
Methods: Central and Volta regions were selected 
for the study. In each region, six districts were 
selected. A two stage sampling approach was used 
to identify women for a household cost survey. A 
sample of 1500 women in Volta region (made up 
of 750 women each before and after the exemption 
policy) and 750 women after the policy was intro-
duced in Central region. 
Outcome Measures: Household out-of-pocket 
payment for maternal delivery and catastrophic 
out-of-pocket health payments. 
Results: There was a statistically significant de-
crease in the mean out-of-pocket payments for 
caesarean section (CS) and normal delivery at 
health facilities after the introduction of the policy. 
The percentage decrease was highest for CS at 
28.40% followed by normal delivery at 25.80%. 
The incidence of catastrophic out-of-pocket pay-
ments also fell. At lower thresholds, the incidence 
of catastrophic delivery payment was concentrated 
more amongst the poor. For the poorest group (1
st
 
quintile) household out-of-pocket payments in 
excess of 2.5% of their pre-payment income 
dropped from 54.54% of the households to 46.38% 
after the exemption policy. The policy had a more 
positive impact on the extreme poor than the poor. 
The richest households (5
th
 quintile) had a decline 
in out-of-pocket payments of 21.51% while the 
poor households (1
st
 quintile) had a 13.18% de-
cline. 
Conclusions: The policy was beneficial to users of 
the service. However, the rich benefited more than 
the poor. There is need for proper targeting to 
identify the poorest of the poor before policies are 
implemented to ensure maximum benefit by the 
target group. 
 
Keywords: Fee Exemption Policy, Maternal De-
livery Care, Catastrophic out-of-Pocket Payments, 
Out-of-Pocket Payments. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The lifetime risk of maternal death in the least 
developed countries is estimated to be greater than 
1 in 10, while for the most developed countries it 
is about 1 in 8,000
1
. Institutional data indicates 
that Ghana has persistently unacceptable high ma-
ternal mortality ratios, estimated to range from 214 
to 800 per 100,000 live births
2
. 
 
In September 2003, the Government of Ghana 
introduced the policy of exempting users of mater-
nity services from delivery fees in the four most 
deprived regions of the country, which are Central, 
Northern, Upper West and Upper East Regions. 
The policy was later extended to the remaining six 
regions of Ghana in April 2005 with the aim of 
reducing financial barriers to using delivery ser-
vices. The prospect was that it would lead to an 
increase in rate of skilled attendance at delivery 
and consequently to a reduction in maternal and 
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perinatal mortality rates, and also contribute to 
poverty reduction
3
.  
 
So far, comparatively little progress has been made 
globally, stimulating donors and governments to 
look for cost-effective and sustainable approaches 
which can reduce maternal mortality.  This is in 
the light of the fact that one of the Millennium 
Development Goals is to reduce maternal mortality 
by three-quarters by 2015
4
. 
 
Increasing the proportion of women who deliver 
with a skilled attendant remains one of the main 
challenges and is a key component of the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative
5
. Ghana has had a persis-
tently high maternal mortality rate, growing social 
inequalities, and rates of skilled attendance being 
either stagnant or declining for poorer women
6
. 
Financial barriers are one of the most important 
factors or constraints to seeking skilled care during 
deliveries. In general, delivery costs tend to be 
lumpy and may sometimes go up as much as 8 
times a household’s monthly income
7
. The fee 
exemption policy, by reducing these costs, may 
play a very important role in increasing the rates of 
skilled attendance and protecting households from 
making catastrophic payments for maternal deliv-
ery and consequently from falling into poverty. 
 
In order to secure sustainability of the fee exemp-
tion policy in Ghana, the Ministry of Health estab-
lished a tariff which set reimbursement rates ac-
cording to the type of delivery and the facility 
type
3
. The institutional arrangement stipulates that 
both the funds and the implementation of the pol-
icy are decentralised to the district level and in-
volve close collaboration between the health sector 
and the District Assemblies, which act as the fund 
manager. The health institution grants the exemp-
tions, and the district health administration acts as 
the bridge between the health institutions and the 
District Assemblies in the reimbursement of health 
institutions. 
 
Access to health services for the poor and vulner-
able in Ghana has been a problem since the intro-
duction of user fees in the mid-1980s. The original 
objective of the user fees policy was to raise reve-
nue and to deter frivolous use of scarce resources 
in the health sector. However, recognising that 
some people could not afford health services, an 
exemption policy for specified categories of the 
poor was introduced. The experience to date shows 
that Ghana has not been able to formulate an effi-
cient exemption mechanism targeted to the poor
8, 9
.  
 
Healthcare payments affect available resources by 
reducing the share of income available to be spent 
on other consumption goods, which may lead to 
poverty when they turn out to be excessive in 
comparison to households’ income
10-12
. By protect-
ing households from such effects of health care 
payments, the fee exemption policy also contrib-
utes to other social goals, in particular poverty 
reduction.  
 
The important questions with regards to the fee 
exemption policy for delivery care in Ghana are 
therefore often expressed on the subject of health-
care payments and poverty. The main objective of 
the study was to evaluate the economic outcomes 
of the policy of fee exemption for delivery care on 
households in Ghana. The specific objectives 
were: 
 To measure the impact of the exemption pol-
icy on households’ cost of maternal delivery 
care. 
  To examine the distribution of the share of 
households’ out-of-pocket payments in house-
hold total income across poverty groups; that 
is, to what extent does the fee exemption pol-
icy protect households from making “catas-
trophic” out-of-pocket payments across pov-
erty groups; and 
 To examine the distribution of households’ 
out-of-pocket payments for delivery care in 
the periods before and after the introduction of 
the fee exemption policy. 
 
SUBJECT AND METHODS 
Study Area 
Central and Volta regions were selected for the 
study based on the following reasons: (i) the policy 
of fee exemption was applied to both regions at 
different times, with a 19 month gap, thus provid-
ing an opportunity to investigate time trends. Cen-
tral region was among the first four regions (one of 
the poorest regions in Ghana) to introduce the pol-
icy, with district-level implementation starting 
between August 2003 and April 2004. In April 
2005, the policy was extended to all regions in 
Ghana, including the Volta region; and (ii) both 
regions comprise districts that have similar socio-
economic profiles and can be matched on the basis 
of presence of a hospital, poverty status, size of the 
population and urban profile. Six districts were 
selected in each region. 
 
Study Design 
Sampling Procedure 
A household costs survey comprising women who 
delivered in the 18 months leading to the survey 
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was conducted. In order to identify women in the 
sampling frame, routine immunisation systems in 
health facilities, child welfare clinics as well as 
community outreach immunisation programmes 
were used. The sampling frame consisted of 
women who had one of the following forms of 
delivery: (i) vaginal delivery at a health facility; 
(ii) vaginal delivery at home or with a Traditional 
Birth Attendant (TBA); and (iii) a caesarean sec-
tion. 
 
Sample Size 
Based on delivery costs estimates in Borghi et 
al.
13
, the sample size for the study was calculated 
in order to test the null-hypothesis that the intro-
duction of the fee exemption policy would signifi-
cantly lower costs to the household. It was esti-
mated that the study would require a sample of 
300 women who had a vaginal delivery in health 
facilities (both normal vaginal deliveries and those 
assisted by instruments), 300 who have had vagi-
nal delivery in their homes or with TBAs, and 150 
women who have had a caesarean section, all be-
fore and after the introduction of fee exemption.  
In all a sample of 1500 women in Volta region and 
750 women in Central region (see Table 1) was 
attempted. For the study, all deliveries before 31
st
 
April 2005 were classified as having taken place 
before the fee exemption policy whiles deliveries 
from 1
st
 May 2005 was classified as period after 
the fee exemption policy. 
 
Table 1 Sample Size for Household Cost Survey 
 
 Volta 
Region 
Central  
Region 
Vaginal Delivery HF 
Vaginal delivery H/TBA 
C Section 
Total 
300 
300 
150 
750 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Vaginal Delivery HF 
Vaginal Delivery H/TBA 
C Section 
Total 
300 
300 
150 
750 
300 
300 
150 
750 
 1500 750 
 
A two-stage approach was used to identify women 
for the household cost survey. The first stage se-
lected health facilities operating immunisation 
programmes and child welfare clinics in all the six 
districts identified for the evaluation in Central and 
Volta regions and sampled women falling into the 
sampling frame. In the second stage the sampled 
women were followed to their homes to administer 
the household cost questionnaire. 
 
Method of Analysis 
Cost of Maternal Delivery Care to Households 
The costs of maternal delivery care to the house-
hold are defined as individuals’ or households’ 
out-of-pocket payments associated with the deliv-
ery. The individuals or households out-of-pocket 
payments for maternal delivery care are made up 
of the following: (a) payment to the delivery ser-
vice provider - for the delivery service, drugs and 
supplies and inpatient stay; (b) items purchased 
outside the facility for delivery; (c) transportation 
cost to and from place of delivery; (d) amount 
spent on gifts to person(s) assisting in delivery; 
and (e) other cost items not listed above but made 
in the course of delivery at the service provider.  
 
These cost can be categorised as direct and indirect 
cost and expressed as C = X + Y, where C = indi-
vidual or household out-of-pocket payment for 
maternal delivery care, X = direct cost associated 
with maternal delivery care, that is (a) and (b) 
above; Y = indirect costs, that is (c), (d) and (e) 
above. 
 
 
Cum % of pop, ranked by decreasing payment fraction 
 
Figure 1 Catastrophic payments as share of pre-payment 
income by cumulative percent of population, ranked by 
decreasing payment fraction. 
 
Catastrophic Health Care Payments 
One way to measure the extent to which a given 
sample of individuals has been exposed to catas-
trophic expenses is the number (or proportion) of 
individuals whose health care costs as a proportion 
of income exceed the threshold. Figure 1 shows 
the cumulative share of the sample, ordered by the 
ratio of out-of-pocket payment for maternal deliv-
ery care to pre-payment income, beginning with 
individuals or households with the largest ratio. At 
a threshold of ∂, one obtains the proportion H of 
the sample whose expenditures as a proportion of 
their income exceed the threshold ∂. This is the 
catastrophic payment headcount. Households thus 
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have at least (1- ∂) of their income to spend on 
things other than maternal delivery care. 
 
The second approach is based on comparing 
households’ pre-payment and post-payment in-
comes relative to some income threshold, below 
which a household would be regarded as poor (see 
figure 2).  In this study we use the Ghana poverty 
lines, Zpov to set these income thresholds.  The 
principle underlying this analysis is that health 
care payments should not push households into 
poverty or worsen their poverty status. 
 
Figure 2 Head count poverty impact on health payments 
 
Figure 2 provides a simple framework for examin-
ing the impact of out-of-pocket payments on a 
basic measure of poverty – the headcount. The 
figure plots income before and after out-of-pocket 
payments (pre-payment and post-payment income, 
respectively) along the y-axis against the cumula-
tive percentage of individuals ranked by pre-
payment income along the x-axis. The point on the 
x-axis where the curve crosses the poverty line 
(HCpre) gives the fraction of people living in pov-
erty “before” healthcare payments. This is called 
the (pre-payment) poverty headcount ratio. 
 
After deducting household payments for delivery 
care, a new income, post payment income (HCpost) 
is obtained. The poverty headcount increase equals 
the distance on the x-axis between HCpre and 
HCpost. 
 
The study adopted the two approaches, the first to 
assess the extent to which the fee exemption policy 
protects households from making catastrophic 
payments and the second approach to assess the 
extent to which fee exemption policy protected 
households from the impoverishing effects of 
health care payments. 
 
Financing Maternal Delivery Care by House-
holds 
Equity in maternal delivery care financing raises a 
lot of issues. Some of the issues are as follows: 
Who pays for maternal delivery care? To what 
extent are payments towards maternal delivery 
care related to ability to pay? Is the relationship 
proportional? Or is it progressive; do maternal 
delivery care payments account for an increasing 
proportion of ability to pay (ATP) as the latter 
rises? Or, is there a regressive relationship, in the 
sense that payments comprise a decreasing share 
of ATP? The policymaker’s preferred relationship 
between maternal delivery care payments and ATP 
will vary with his or her conception of fairness, but 
quantification of the relationship is of interest from 
a wide range of equity perspectives. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the sample composition by place 
and type of delivery for women in the sample who 
delivered before and after introduction of the pol-
icy of fee exemptions. There was a fall in 
home/TBA deliveries and normal deliveries at 
health facilities from 42.7% to 40.3% and 47.8% 
to 45.3%, respectively. With c-sections, there was 
an increase from 9.6% to 14.5%.  
 
Table 2 Type of Delivery Before/After Fee Ex-
emption Policy  
 
Fee Exemption Policy  
Type Before After 
Home/TBA 
 
Caesarean section 
 
Normal delivery at 
health facility 
42.7 
 
9.6 
 
47.8 
40.3 
 
14.5 
 
45.3 
Source: Computed from survey data 
 
Cost of Maternal Delivery Care to Households 
The percentage decrease in delivery fees was high-
est for c-sections at 28.4% followed by normal 
delivery at health facility (25.8%) and home/TBA 
delivery (13.7%). A similar pattern was also ob-
served for total payment for delivery care.  The 
total payment for c-section fell by 21.6%; normal 
deliveries in health facilities by 18.9% and 
home/TBAs, 7.6% (Table 3). 
 
The share of mean households’ out-of-pocket 
payment for delivery (delivery fee at the facility) 
in total payment for delivery care declined after 
the exemption policy. The percentage point change 
in decline was more for caesarean section delivery 
Pre-payment 
income Post-
payment 
income 
Hpre Cumulative percent of 
population ranked by 
income 
 
Hpost 
Poverty 
line, Zpov 
 
Income 
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than normal deliveries at health facilities (Table 4). 
A similar pattern is also observed in the mean 
share of delivery fee in total out-of-pocket pay-
ment for delivery (Table 5). The mean share of 
delivery fee in delivery payment to facility at 
home/TBA slightly increased in the Volta region 
after the fee exemption policy.  
 
Catastrophic and Impoverishment in Paying 
for Maternal Delivery Care 
The distribution of catastrophic out-of-pocket 
payment shows a fall after the exemption policy. 
For the poorest (1
st
 quintile) group, before the ex-
emption policy, 54.54% of the households re-
corded out-of-pocket payments in excess of 2.5% 
of their pre-payment income. This fell to 46.38% 
of households after the exemption policy. The 
trend follows a similar pattern from the poor to the 
rich as the threshold level increases (Table 6). 
 
Adjusting the poverty lines of 1999 of 700,000 
cedis (extreme poor) and 900,000 cedis (poor) to 
2005 prices, payments for maternal deliveries in-
crease the poverty head count by 1.3 percentage 
Table 3 Mean Out-Of-Pocket Payment for Delivery Care before /after policy (thousands of cedis) 
 
Delivery Fees Total Payments for Deliveries  
 
Type of Delivery  
Before 
 
After 
 
Percentage 
Change 
t-value 
[P(T>t)] 
 
Before 
 
After 
 
Percentage 
Change 
t-value 
[P(T>t)] 
 
Home/TBA 
 
 
62.0 
 
53,4 
 
13.7 
 
1.1428 
[0.1267] 
 
203.9 
 
186,4 
 
7.6 
 
1.2258 
[0.1103] 
 
Caesarean Section 
 
1,396.5 
 
999.6 
 
 
28.4 
 
2.7314 
[0.0034] 
 
1,755.7 
 
1,375.5 
 
 
21.6 
 
 
2.3308 
[0.0102] 
Normal Delivery  
at Health Facility 
 
152.1 
 
112.8 
 
 
25.8 
 
3.2529 
[0.0006] 
 
378.5 
 
306.7 
 
18.9 
 
2.8632 
[0.0021] 
Source: Computed from survey data 
 
Table 4 Mean households’ out-of-pocket payments for maternal delivery (before and after exemption) 
(thousand of cedis) 
 
Volta Central 
Before After After 
 
 
 
Type of 
Delivery 
Delivery  
Pay-
ments 
To 
Health  
Facility2 
Total 
Pay-
ments  
For De-
livery3 
Ratio of  
Facility 
Payment  
In Total 
Delivery 
Pay-
ments  
To 
Health  
Facility 
Total  
Pay-
ments  
For De-
livery 
Ratio of  
Facility  
Payment  
In Total 
Delivery 
Pay-
ments  
To 
Health 
Facility 
Total  
Pay-
ments  
For De-
livery 
Ratio of 
Health 
Facility 
Payment  
In Total 
 
Home/TBA 
 
64.0 
 
210.8 
 
30.33 
 
51.2 
 
194.10 
 
26.37 
 
56.4 
 
176.4 
 
31.94 
 
Caesarean 
Section 
 
1,725.5 
 
2,119.0 
 
81.43 
 
772.9 
 
1,189.0 
 
64.97 
 
1,198.4 
 
1,538.5 
 
77.89 
Normal De-
livery  
at Health 
Facility1 
 
172.6 
 
404.7 
 
42.65 
 
110.8 
 
329.6 
 
33.67 
 
116.0 
 
267.5 
 
43.44 
Combined 274.5 485.6 56.53 164.6 376.6 43.70 290.5 463.6 62.65 
1Refers to assisted by hand/equipment at health facility 
2Refers to out-of-pocket payment to delivery service provider for delivery; includes card, laboratory tests/x-ray, medicines/supplies received from service provider, 
delivery fee, use of operating theatre and in patient stay and food 
3Refers to payment to delivery service provider, items purchased outside the facility, transport to and from facility, gifts to person assisting in delivery and other 
payments made at facility 
 
Source: Computed from survey data 
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Table 6 Distribution of the catastrophic out-of-pocket payment head-count by expenditure quintile 
 
Combined 
(Threshold) 
Before exemption 
(Threshold) 
After Exemption 
(Threshold) 
 
Quintile 
2.5% 5.0% 10.0% 2.5% 5.0% 10.0% 2.5% 5.0% 10.0% 
1 48.55 20.94 9.8 54.54 23.78 10.48 46.38 19.74 9.21 
2 30.51 11.35 4.0 33.57 12.59 4.20 28.19 9.83 3.60 
3 31.11 13.78 4.7 33.79 16.55 4.83 29.70 12.87 4.62 
4 29.84 13.36 4.9 29.07 12.06 4.96 31.47 14.75 5.24 
5 33.18 14.25 6.7 35.66 15.38 9.79 31.02 13.20 4.95 
Source: Computed from survey data 
Table 7 Poverty Head count and the fee exemption policy  
 Before Exemption  After Exemption 
 Pre-
payment 
Poverty 
Head 
Count 
Post-
payment 
Poverty 
Head Count 
Poverty 
Head-
count 
Impact 
 Pre-
payment 
Poverty 
Head Count 
Post-
payment 
Poverty 
Head 
Count 
Headcount 
Poverty 
Impact 
REGIONS COMBINED  
Poor 56.6 57.9 1.3 Poor 56.3 58.5 2.2 
Extreme 
Poor 40.2 42.7 2.5 
Extreme 
Poor 39.3 40.6 1.3 
VOLTA REGION 
Poor 58 59.2 1.2 Poor 57.9 60 2.1 
Extreme 
Poor 41.8 44 2.2 
Extreme 
Poor 40.7 41.9 1.2 
CENTRAL REGION 
Poor  - - - Poor 53.4 54.7 1.3 
Extreme 
Poor   - - 
Extreme 
Poor 36.7 38.3 1.6 
Source: Computed from survey data 
 
points before the exemption policy (Table 7). After 
the fee exemption policy, payments for maternal 
delivery increase the poverty head count by 2.2 
percentage points.  The fee exemption policy thus 
Table 5  Mean Households’ out-of-pocket Payments for Delivery Fee (before and after exemption) (thousand of cedis) 
 
Volta Central 
Before After After 
 
 
 
 
Type of De-
livery 
Deliv-
ery  
Fee 
Deliv-
ery 
Pay-
ments  
to Fa-
cility 
Ratio of 
Delivery 
Fee - De-
livery 
Payment 
to Health 
Facility 
Deliv-
ery   
Fee 
Delivery 
Pay-
ments to  
Facility 
Ratio of 
Delivery 
Fee - De-
livery 
Payment 
to Health 
Facility 
Deliv-
ery  
Fee 
Deliv-
ery 
Pay-
ments  
to Fa-
cility 
Ratio of 
Delivery 
Fee - Deliv-
ery Payment 
to Health 
Facility 
 
Home/TBA 
 
52.5 
 
64.0 
 
82.00 
 
52.2 
 
51.2 
 
101.95 
 
52.2 
 
56.4 
 
92.70 
 
Caesarean 
Section 
 
1,133.3 
 
1,725.5 
 
65.66 
 
273.5 
 
772.9 
 
35.38 
 
255.0 
 
1,198.4 
 
21.28 
Normal De-
livery  
at Health 
Facility 
 
136.6 
 
172.6 
 
79.14 
 
63.4 
 
110.9 
 
 
57.11 
 
56.6 
 
116.0 
 
48.81 
 
Combined 
 
 
166.5 
 
274.5 
 
60.65 
 
82.8 
 
164.6 
 
50.32 
 
55.2 
 
290.5 
 
18.99 
Source: Computed from survey data 
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appears not to have any effect on poor as the im-
poverishing effect of health care payments in-
creases before and after the policy the imple-
mented. The pattern reverses for the extreme poor. 
The proportion of households classified as extreme 
poor as a result of payments for maternal delivery 
fell from 2.5 percentage points before the fee ex-
emption policy to 1.3 percentage points after the 
fee exemption policy.  
 
Financing Maternal Delivery Care 
Table 8 shows financing of maternal delivery care 
by households. The mean share of out-of-pocket 
delivery payment in total household income de-
clined after the policy of fee exemption for deliv-
ery care. The decline ranges from 13.18% for the 
poorest households (1
st
 quintile) to 21.51% in the 
richest households (5
th
 quintile). The middle in-
come group (3
rd
 quintile) had a decline of 16.32%.  
 
Table 8 Mean Share of Out-of-Pocket Payment in 
Total Income 
 
Volta Region Combined (Volta and 
Central Regions) 
 
Qui
ntil
e 
Before After  Change Before After     Change 
1 0.0506 0.0381 -0.24704 0.0478 0.0415 -0.1318 
2 0.0311 0.0245 -0.21222 0.0327 0.0266 -0.18654 
3 0.0308 0.0269 -0.12662 0.0337 0.0282 -0.1632 
4 0.0366 0.026 -0.28962 0.0276 0.0294 0.065217 
5 0.0365 0.0246 -0.32603 0.033 0.0259 -0.21515 
Source: Computed from Survey data 
 
DISCUSSION 
Ghana has had a persistently high maternal mortal-
ity rate, growing social inequalities rates, and rates 
of skilled attendance being either stagnant or de-
clining for poorer women. Financial barriers are 
one of the most important factors or constraints to 
seeking skilled care during deliveries. The fee ex-
emption policy, may play a very important role in 
protecting households from making catastrophic 
payments for delivery care and consequently from 
falling into poverty. 
 
The total costs of delivery to households are often 
determined by type and place of delivery.  The 
type of delivery can be linked to the type of facil-
ity where delivery took place. Caesarean sections 
are always performed at the hospital (public, pri-
vate or mission). Normal deliveries at health facili-
ties can occur in a hospital (public, private or mis-
sion), health center or maternity homes. 
Home/TBA deliveries are usually assisted by tradi-
tional birth attendants, mother/mother-in-law, 
friends/neighbours or a health worker in the com-
munity. Caesarean section (c-section) is always 
performed by a medical doctor and normal deliver-
ies at health facilities are by midwives/nurses. 
 
Deliveries by c-sections increased after the imple-
mentation of the fee exemption policy for maternal 
delivery. As expected home/TBA deliveries fell 
during the same period. Normal deliveries at 
health facilities also fell after the exemption policy 
but this was not expected as we expect more 
mothers to take advantage of the policy. 
 
Table 3 shows significant changes in the mean out-
of-pocket payment for delivery care (direct and 
indirect payments for delivery) at health facilities, 
both for spontaneous vaginal deliveries and deliv-
ery by c-sections. Although there was some 
change in mean out-of-pocket payment for deliv-
ery fee and total payment for delivery care for 
home/TBA births following the introduction of the 
fee exemption policy, this was not statistically 
significant.  
 
The “catastrophic head count” for health care 
payments measures the extent to which a given 
sample of individuals has been exposed to catas-
trophic expenses. It is the proportion of individuals 
whose health care costs as a proportion of income 
exceed the threshold level. Generally, at lower 
thresholds, the incidence of “catastrophic” delivery 
payments is more concentrated amongst the poor, 
both before and after the exemption policy. In con-
trast at higher thresholds, the incidence of “catas-
trophic” delivery payments is more concentrated 
amongst the rich in both periods. Analysis of fi-
nancing maternal delivery care shows that house-
holds in the richest quintile benefited more from 
the policy of fee exemption for delivery care (Ta-
ble 8). 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY REC-
OMMENDATION 
There was a statistically significant decrease in the 
mean out-of-pocket payment for c-section and 
normal delivery at the health facility after the ex-
emption policy. The share of mean households’ 
out-of-pocket payment for delivery in total pay-
ment for delivery care declined after the exemption 
policy. A similar pattern was also observed in the 
mean share of delivery fee in total out-of-pocket 
payment for delivery. 
 
In terms of financing maternal delivery care, 
households in the richest quintile benefited more 
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from the fee exemption policy for delivery care 
than for poor households. The mean share of out-
of-pocket delivery payment in total household in-
come declined from 13.18% for poor households 
(1
st
 quintile) to 21.51% in the rich households (5
th
 
quintile). 
 
The distribution of incidence of catastrophic out-
of-pocket payments shows a fall after the exemp-
tion policy. Generally, at lower thresholds, the 
incidence of catastrophic delivery payment is more 
concentrated amongst the poor before and after the 
exemption policy. In contrast, at high thresholds, 
the incidence of catastrophic delivery payments 
was more concentrated amongst the rich in both 
periods. 
 
The fee exemption policy had a positive effect on 
the extreme poor than the poor. The proportion of 
households falling into extreme poverty (by pov-
erty head count) as a result of payments for mater-
nal delivery fell from 2.5 percentage points before 
the fee exemption policy to 1.3 percentage points 
after the policy. 
 
Finally, in the implementation of such pro-
grammes in the future, the Government should 
have a clear definition of the poor. This will ensure 
proper targeting of the poor so that maximum im-
pact is made at the end of the programme. 
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